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INTRODUCTION
The expression "unfair competition", as it is used in this
article, is restricted to a particular type of unfair competition;
that is, the measures employed by individuals, firms, cartels,' and
other combinations in the interest of their monopolistic aims, to
combat open competition and to contravene the natural effects of
the economic law of supply and demand. In the same way as the
law of the various nations condemns certain kinds of open compe-
tition as unfair, it also forbid 'certain methods of eliminating free
competition. The differences which exist between the laws of the
various states in regard to this subject are considerable, and are a
result of the different points of view which the statutes and the
decisions take in regard to the problems arising' out of cartels,
trusts, and monopolies.
This article will discuss certain typical measures used by busi-
ness concerns in their endeavor to restrain free competition, and
will investigate and determine their legality or illegality from the
A cartel is a combination of commercial concerns in a particular industry,
said combination being created by law.
(693)
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German, the English, and the American legal viewpoints. It will
first treat the law of each of these countries separately, and at the
close of the article will draw comparisons between the attitudes
taken on these questions by the courts and the legislative bodies of
these three nations.
I. GERMAN LAW
The provisions of the German law which are of importance
are as follows:
THE CARTEL ORDER-THE ORDER AGAINST THE ABUSE OF
ECONOMIC POWER.
2
Section I : Agreements and resolutions which contain obliga-
tions regarding the production of commodities or the distribution
thereof, the application of business terms, the manner of fixing
or demanding prices thereof (syndicates, cartels, conventions,
combinations in restraint of trade, and similar agreements) must
be made in writing.
Section 4: If an agreement or a resolution of the kind desig-
nated in Section I,3 or a certain manner of its enforcement, is
dangerous to the general economic situation or public policy, the
Reichswirtschaftsminister4 may: ( I ) apply to the Cartel Court '
to have the agreement or resolution declared null and void, or the
manner of its enforcement prohibited (Section 7); (2) order
that any party concerned in the agreement or resolution may give
notice of termination or withdrawal at any time; (3) order that
a copy of all arrangements and dispositions taken for the enforce-
ment of the said agreement or resolution be filed with him and
that these measures shall take effect only after the receipt of such
copy thereof.
2
KARTELLVERORDNUNG, R. G. BI. 1923, I, IO67 et seq., io9O.
" References to sections of the Cartel Order (KARTELUVERORDNUNG) are,
for the most part, to sections of which a translation is given in this article.
Where the text of sections cited is not given herein, mention of this fact will
be made.
'Minister of Economics, a member of the President's cabinet.
SA division of the National Economic Court (Reichswuirtschafisgericht),
having as its function the prevention of the "misuse of situations of economic
power", particularly by the cartels. The court was created by the KARTELL-
VERORDNUNG, supra note 2. More specific functions of the Cartel Court will
be considered infra.
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The general economic situation or public welfare is regarded
as endangered when unjustifiable methods are pursued to limit
production and distribution, when prices are forced up or kept at
a high level, when excess is added to offset risk in the case of
price-fixing arrangements, or when economic freedom is influ-
enced unfairly by the hampering of buying and selling or by dis-
crimination in prices or conditions of sale.
Section 7: In the case of Section 4 (i) the Cartel Court has
to declare the agreement or resolution null and void in whole or
in part, or has to prohibit the particular method of its enforcement
which is in question, if it considers it harmful to the general eco-
nomic situation or against public policy. If it considers the order
provided for in Section 4 (I) reasonable, it may make such order
instead of pronouncing the decree of nullity or injunction.
If the Cartel Court declares part of the agreement or resolu-
tion null and void, it simultaneously has to decide whether and to
what extent nullity of such part carries with it nullity of other
parts of the agreement or resolution.
The Cartel Court may revoke an order made in accordance
with Section I (2)6 if the conditions requiring the order subse-
quently cease to exist.
Section 9: Under agreements or resolutions of the kind des-
ignated in Section i, securities given for the enforcement of the
same may not be forfeited, and boycotts or disadvantages of a
similar character may not be declared without the consent of the
president of the Cartel Court.
Such consent is to be refused, if the measure would adversely
affect the general economic situation or public policy, or would be
in unreasonable restraint of the trade of the party concerned.
The consent is to be looked upon as given if the president,
within three weeks after receipt of the application for his consent,
has not rendered any decision thereon.
Against the decision of the president of the Cartel Court or
the authorities provided for in Section 4, the parties may invoke
the decision of the Cartel Court within one week after service of
the decision in question.
6 Not quoted in this article.
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Section io: If terms of business or methods of fixing prices
by firms or by combinations thereof (trusts, syndicates, cartels,
conventions, and similar associations) tend through exploitation
of economic power to endanger the general economic situation or
public policy [Section 4 (2)], the Cartel Court may, upon appli-
cation of the Reichsairtschaftsminister, permit the parties affected
by the contract to withdraw from all agreements which have been
concluded under the conditions objected to. If it be assumed that
the agreement would also have been concluded without the condi-
tions objected to, the decision of the Cartel Court only allows
withdrawal from the said terms of business, or from the agree-
ment in which unreasonable prices were fixed.
In the case of agreements which require several independent
part-performances (agreements for successive delivery), with-
drawal is excluded in so far as a part-performance has been com-
pletely executed by both contracting parties.
The decision of the Cartel Court is to be published in the
manner provided in its order.
The right of withdrawal is forfeited, if it is not declared
within two weeks after the publication of the decision.
Agreements which are concluded after publication of the
decisions are null and void in so far as their conditions are objected
to in the decision. Section 139 of the German Civil Code 7 is
also applicable.
Disputes as to whether and to what extent withdrawal accord-
ing to Section 4 (I) (2) is permissible, or whether agreements
are null and void in full or in part according to Section 5,8 are to
be decided by the ordinary courts of law.
Upon application of the Reichswirtschaftminister, or of its
own accord, the Cartel Court may revoke or amend a decision
under Section i, if the conditions which caused the decision have
subsequently ceased to exist. The decision is to be published and
becomes operative from the date of its publication.
Section i39, infra note 9, provides: "If a part of a transaction is void,
the entire transaction is void, unless it may be assumed that it would have been
entered into without the part which is void."
8 Not quoted in this article.
METHODS OF REGULATING UNFAIR COMPETITION 697
THE GERMAN CIVIL CODE. 9
Section 138: A transaction in violation of good morals is
void.
Section 823: One who wilfully or negligently injures life,
body, health, property, or any right of another is bound to com-
pensate the other for the injury arising therefrom.
The same obligation rests upon one who violates a law, the
purpose of which is to offer protection to another. If a violation
of the law without fault is possible, the obligation to render com-
pensation is applicable only in the case of fault.
Section 826: One who wilfully injures another in a manner
contrary to good morals is bound to compensate the other for the
injury.
THE LAW AGAINST UNFAIR COMPETITION. 0
We shall not investigate here how far unfair regulation of
competition is subject to the provisions of the law against unfair
competition. The Reichsgericht, in a decision handed down in
I9O2,11 refused to apply the statute against unfair competition to a
boycott which was declared because of nonconformity to the
agreed resale prices, because, as it said, the boycott was not de-
clared "for the purpose of unfair competition" but to "exclude
unfair competition by undercutting of prices" by those against
whom the boycott was directed.
An investigation of this question is of no great practical
importance, as the fact that the law against unfair competition is
not applied is practically compensated for by the application of
Section 826 of the Civil Code.
'BURGERLICHES GESETZBUCH FOR DAs DEUTSCHE REICH (Y896), hereafter
cited B. G. B. For English translation, see LOEWy, GERMAN CIVIx CODE (i909).
" GESETz ZUR BEKXMPFUNG DES UNLAUTEREN WETTBEWERBS (1896). This
law remained in force after the introduction of the Civil Code, by virtue of
EINFUHRUNGSGESETZ ZUM, B. G. B., art. 32, Loewy, op. cit. supra note 9, at
576, which provides: "The laws of the empire shall remain in force. They
become, however, of no force so far as the revocation results Sfrom the Civil
Code or from this act." This is the introductory act to the Civil Code.
'Artist. Union E. K. M. & Co. v. d. B6rsenverein d. Deut. Buchhindler,
56 Zivil. 271, 277 (1902). (The decisions of the Supreme Court (Reichsgericht)
in civil cases are published in the Zivilsachen. This reporter will be cited
"Zivil." hereafter.)
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JURISDICTION OF THE COURTS.
The interpretation and application of the special order con-
cerning cartels 12 devolves upon the Cartel Court, a section of the
Reichswirtschaftsgericht. The duty of the former is to protect
the individual and the general economic life from being endan-
gered by the practices of cartels. This Cartel Court is competent
to examine whether certain cartel measures, which without sanc-
tion of law would constitute a tort according to private law, are to
be permitted.
In so far as measures regulating competition are not in viola-
tion of the Cartel Order, but do contravene the provisions of the
Civil Code, they are subject to the jurisdiction of the ordinary
courts. The latter are also competent to adjudicate actions based
on claims for damages arising out of the fact that the measure in
question, not having the permission of the Cartel Court as pro-
vided for in the Cartel Order, is illegal. In case the Cartel Court
has rendered judgment in a certain matter, this decision is final
and binding on the ordinary courts, even in a case where the Cartel
Court has affirmed or denied its jurisdiction.
In order to understand the following discussion concerning
the German legal viewpoint with regard to the specific problems
arising under the codified provisions of the law already stated, it
is of fundamental importance to bear in mind that as soon as a
specific state of facts is given which comes under the Cartel Order,
the Cartel Court alone has jurisdiction, to the exclusion of the
ordinary courts, and that the Cartel Court renders its judgments
from the viewpoint of general economic policy. Measures con-
cerning the regulation of competition which do not come under
the Cartel Order are judged by the ordinary courts according to
the provisions laid down in the Civil Code, already quoted.
A. Boycott and Similar Measures
The term "boycott" refers to the measures taken by enter-
prises, or combinations or associations of enterprises, under which
a firm or a group of firms is excluded from the usual business
' Supra p. 694 et seq.
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intercourse.' 3 In accordance with the limitations we have imposed
upon our subject, we are concerned here only with the boycott
against third parties. This boycott has for its aim the control
of competition, either by trying to force the parties injured thereby
to submit themselves to the business terms imposed by those who
have declared the boycott, or by trying to eliminate undesirable
competitors. Boycotts of this sort may be based on so-called
"exclusive contracts", which are agreements between the members
of a cartel, or between the members of cartels of different indus-
trial groups; or between them and customers or suppliers, whereby
the parties obligate themselves to deal solely with one another and
consequently to exclude outsiders from selling to or buying from
the parties to the agreement.
While the purpose of the boycott is to effect complete exclu-
sion of outsiders from buying or selling, the purpose of "injurious
measures of similar meaning" 14 is to place non-members in an
even more disadvantageous position in business intercourse by
means of discrimination in prices or in terms of delivery, pay-
ment, etc. 5 We shall next consider the application respectively
of the provisions of the Cartel Order, the Civil Code, and the Law
Against Unfair Competition to the specific problem of the boycott.
a. Boycotts Under the Cartel Order.
In dealing with a boycott, the provisions of the Cartel Order
are first to be applied. According to these provisions, agreements
or resolutions concerning the production or sale of commodities,
the influencing of business conditions, the fixing of prices, the
establishment of boycotts, or the adoption of injurious measures
of similar effect are forbidden unless existing with the express per-
mission of the president of the Cartel Court. The permission is
to be refused if the measure in question would endanger the gen-
eral economic welfare or the public good, or would unreasonably
ICf. Luley, KARTELLRUNDSCHAU (1928) 206 et seq. (The KARTELLRUND-
SCHAU is a periodical dealing with problems arising in connection with the
cartels and the Cartel Court, and containing digests of the decisions of the
latter. It will be cited hereafter as KARTELL.)
KARTELLVERORDNiNG, supra note 2, § 9(1).
Luley, supra note 13, at 207.
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limit the economic freedom of the party or parties concerned
thereby.
Boycotts or similar measures within the meaning of Sections
i and 9 of the Cartel Order are, therefore, not permissible without
the approval of the president of the Cartel Court or the Cartel
Court itself. If such measures are undertaken without this
approval, then under one section of the Civil Code 16 they are
absolutely void, and constitute a tort under Section 823 of the
Civil Code, which gives the injured person a right of action for
damages.
The decisions of the Cartel Court, as well as those of the
ordinary courts which have been called upon for protection under
Section 823, prohibiting boycotts established without the required
permission, have discussed the question in detail, without, how-
ever, having reached a thoroughly unequivocal answer as to what
constitutes "a boycott or measures similar to a boycott" within
the meaning of Section 9 of the Cartel Order.
"Exclusive contracts" do not in themselves constitute a boy-
cott. The permission of neither the Cartel Court nor its president
is necessary before they may be entered into. However, when they
are put in operation against definite persons or firms, this is a
specific measure which is equivalent to the declaration of a boycott
and which is not permissible without the consent of the authorities.
On the other hand, not every case where business intercourse
with a customer is refused because the terms of the transaction as
recommended by the organization to its members have not been
accepted, constitutes a boycott requiring official permission. If
merely terms of business are concerned in a specific transaction or
class of transactions, and there is no intention to restrain compe-
tition thereby, the question of boycotting does not arise. The
tradesman is simply taking advantage of his unlimited right to
refuse to enter into any contractual relation which he does not
consider conducive to the furtherance of his commercial interests.
No fixed rule of law has as yet been laid down as to how far
GB. G. B. § 134, supra note 9, LoEwY, op. cit. supra note 9, at 35: "A
transaction which violates a prohibition is void, unless a different conclusion
may be drawn from the prohibiting law."
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the refusal of a preferred rebate (treurabatt) can be considered a
disadvantage of sufficient importance to bring-it within the for-
bidden class. A preferred rebate is a reduction of prices, granted
to customers who deal exclusively with the members 6f the cartel,
syndicate or monopolistic enterprise in question, and which is
granted only so long as the exclusive-dealing clause is adhered to.
Very often it is provided, under the terms of the contract, that as
soon as a violation occurs the rebates granted in the past must be
returned. The withdrawal of the rebate for the future constitutes
a price discrimination in favor of a faithful customer and against
the disloyal one, which, under some circumstances, may constitute
a serious disadvantage to, or even the complete destruction of, the
economic freedom of action or the business existence of the cus-
tomer in question. In such cases, the rebate is deemed a "boycott
or similar measure" and needs the approval of the Cartel Court.1"
On the other hand, the Reichsgericht held in the same deci-
sion I8 that the claim for the return of the rebates granted in the
past is to be considered as a claim for payment of a penalty agreed
upon in the case of a breach of contract, as provided for in the
Civil Code,19 and that its nature, purpose, end, and effect have
nothing to do with "an injurious measure of similar importance"
materially increasing the difficulties of usual and general business
intercourse. Such a contractual provision is not intended to pre-
vent the other party from buying, selling, reselling, or obtaining
credit, or to make it more difficult for him to do these things. It
is solely the compensation required by the terms of the contract
for intentional and premeditated breach of the agreement. In so
far as the claim for the return of the customer's rebate constitutes
a penalty for breach of the contract, another section of the Civil
Code 20 is to be applied. According to that section, if the penalty
'TVerkaufstelle d. Drahtglasfabriken v. B1. & Co., 122 Zivil. 26o (1928);
Luley, supra note 13, at 261.
'sIbid.
x' B. G. B. § 339, supra note 9, LoEwy, op. cit. supra note 9, at 85: "If the
debtor promises, in the event that he does not fulfill his obligation, or does not
fulfill it in the proper manner, the payment of a sum of money as penalty, the
penalty is forfeited, if he is in default. If the perfoimance consists in an
omission, the forfeiture takes place upon the omission."
'lbid. § 343, LOEWY, ibid. 86.
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is excessive it may be reduced on application to the courts.
Whether a preferred rebate connected with an exclusive-dealing
clause constitutes a measure similar to a boycott against outsiders,
is a question to be decided in each individual case according to its
special circumstances.
The Reichsgericht, in a recent decision 21 handed down in a
case where the customer entitled to the rebate was not obligated to
purchase exclusively from the cartel, took the view that the
measure in question did not constitute a boycott against the out-
sider. The court said:
"It is entirely within the discretion of the purchasers to
decide whether they desire, in a specific case, to enter into a
contract with the members of the cartel or with the plaintiff.
If they choose the former, it cannot be said that the cartel had
imposed upon the plaintiff an 'injurious measure similar to a
boycott'."
The Reichsgericht does not consider, in this case, the question
whether granting a preferred rebate constitutes a boycott if the
purchasers at the same time subject themselves to an exclusive-
dealing clause.
In the same way, the Reichsgericht in another recent deci-
sion 22 declared the so-called "deferred rebates" a legal method of
combat.23  The facts in that case were as follows: The shipping
lines which were members of the La Plata conference had granted
those firms which shipped their goods exclusively through the
members of the conference a customer's rebate on all net freight-
age. This rebate was not, however, payable immediately, but
was deferred six months and was only due if the customer in
question, during this period, had maintained his loyalty to the
conference. The Reichsgericht denied a right of action to an
association of freighters who attacked this system as an infringe-
'Rh. Linoleum-Werke B. v. Deut. Linoleum-Werke et at, 119 Zivil. 366
(1928).
'JURISTICHE WOCHENSCHRIFT (1927) 302. (The JURiSTICHHE WocHEN-
scHriur is a periodical containing juristic articles and digests of court decisions.
It will hereafter be cited "J. W." Where such decisions are by the Reichs-
gericht, they will hereafter be cited R. G. in 3. W.)
STSCHIERSCHiY, KARThLLORGANISATION, 140 et seq.
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ment under Section 826 of the Civil Code. 24 It stated that it was
true that the business field of action of the freighting company
was materially infringed upon by these measures; but such in-
fringement of the business field of action frequently accompanies
the economic competitive struggle, and is not illegal so long as it
does not exclusively aim to injure the parties in question, but is
employed to expand and strengthen the enterprise in its economic
combat, and, as in the present case, is effected by legal means that
are not unreasonably excessive. A boycott, within the meaning
of Section 9 of the Cartel Order, cannot be found in this system
if third parties are able to compete with the freight rates, and the
customers therefore do not have to rely on the rebates granted by
the lines of the conference.
On the other hand, the Cartel Court (the decisions of which
are final and binding on the ordinary courts and arbitration tribu-
nals) 25 in two recent decisions 26 considered that there was a boy-
cott when a preferred rebate was granted and an exclusive-dealing
clause was also imposed. The engagement undertaken by the cus-
tomer in his agreement binds him to exclusive business connection
with the members of the association, and, according to the wording
and meaning of it, forms the contractual basis which permits the
association to employ the force of the organization against the
customer and also against third parties, and, by threatening finan-
cial injury, cancellation, or return of the rebate, to restrain the
customer from entering into such business relations with third
parties.
Before the association can declare such a boycott measure and
carry it out against third parties, it must have permission from the
authorities as provided for in Section 9 of the Cartel Order. A
general answer cannot be given to the question as to what measures
of an association constitute carrying out such a boycott, but each
case must be considered individually. Usually a boycott is effected
by the declaration of the association indicating the parties with
whom the customer must refuse to have business relations in
11 Supra p. 697.
SIARTELLVERORDNUNG, supra note I, at 12.
2KARTEIL.T (1928) 735; ibid. (1929) 283.
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regard to orders concerning the preferential rebate, in order to
avoid breaking his obligation of loyalty. Such a declaration can
be made to the customer obligated by his signature as well as
directly to the third party in question.
The "turn-over premium"-that is,
. . . the consideration paid for the purchase of a certain
quantity of goods while the customer is free to buy where he
likes to, is not to be considered, in its nature, an exclusive
clause. It only becomes such an exclusive clause when it is
dependent not only on the amount of the turn-over but also
on the fact that the customer undertakes to purchase his whole
supply of goods from the same supplier." 27
b. Boycotts Under the Civil Code
The necessity for securing permission to declare a boycott or
a similar measure, as set forth in Section 9 of the Cartel Order,
relates only to measures undertaken by cartels; that is, it applies
only to agreements to which at least one of the parties is a cartel.
In other cases the Cartel Order does not apply, but the principles
of freedom of economic action of the individual remain in force.
The limits here set are determined by the ordinary courts, without
the assistance of the Cartel Court. The decisions of the ordinary
courts are not, as in the case of the Cartel Court, based on consid-
erations of whether general economic life, the public welfare, or
the economic freedom of the individual are endangered, but are
concerned rather with considerations of whether, according to the
opinion of just and fair thinking persons, the measure complained
of would be regarded as permissible.
The attempt to form a monopoly is not, according to the
decisions of the ordinary courts, per se illegal, so long as the
methods employed thereby are permissible and the purpose of the
monopoly is not contra bonos inores.28 It is an illegal abuse of a
monopoly if the methods employed are in themselves illegal; or if
they serve solely to damage the other party; or if under the cir-
cumstances of the case they appear unfair or unjust because, in
'Rh. Linoleum-Werke B. v. Deut. Linoleum-Werke et al, supra note 21,
at 370.
I R. G. in J. W. (1929) 3oo4.
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the first place, they are such as might totally end the economic
existence of the party injured, or at least damage him to an extent
not in fair proportion to the advantages to be gained thereby, and
because, in the second place, they appear to be actuated by malice
toward the party injured.20
Measures taken for self-protection may also be contra bonos
mores. In considering the question, however, whether they are
permissible, their purpose must especially be considered. Meas-
ures which, if taken for any other reason would not be permissible
as methods of competition, may be allowed if undertaken for pur-
poses of self-protection. However, the means employed must not
be unfair. To this extent, the limits set for competition are the
same as those set for self-protection."0
It must not be concluded from the fact that the use of certain
measures in the economic struggle may not be employed up to the
point of destroying, or injuring to an unfair extent, the business
affected, that every act which endangers the economic existence of
another competitor is contra bonos mores. It cannot be expected
that the defendant must disregard his own interests and deliver
merchandise to the plaintiff solely that the business of the latter
may continue. 31 According to these principles, the declaration or
the threat of a delivery or purchase boycott is, in itself, not contra
bonos mores.32 The threat of the defendant, made to the suppliers
of the plaintiff, that he would discontinue relations with them if
they continued to sell to the plaintiff was not deemed illegal, be-
cause the defendant was simply acting in his own business interest
and such acts done even with the knowledge that one's competitors
are being injured is not contra bonos mores.
The declaration of a boycott against a third party who is
undercutting the reasonable sale prices of the boycotting associa-
tion is declared to be justified; and a cutting-off of supplies, an act
to which the defendant has subjected himself in case he does not
maintain the resale prices agreed to by himself, is not looked upon
'Ibid (1927) 3002.
'Iblid. 112.
"Ibid. (1928) 1206.
"Verb. Deut. Damen-u. M,dchen-Nintelfabrikanten v. H., 85 Zivil. 177,
ISI (1914).
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as a measure which is contra bonos mores.3 3 The boycott, how-
ever, can assume the character of a measure contra bonos mores if
it is used in an illegal manner to force the party injured thereby
to perform a certain act. The Reichsgericht held a boycott contrat
bonos mores in a case where it was declared by a roofing associa-
tion against a seller of roofing material because the latter did not
agree to charge on sales to outsiders a premium amounting to
twenty-five per cent more than the prices charged members of the
association; the premium to be paid to the association. The court
stated that the proposition made to the boycotted party and refused
by him was contra bonos mores.34 The plaintiff was not only un-
justly forced to enter into a contract which he did not desire, but
this contract would also have forced him to increase his prices for
deliveries to firms not members of the association and to pay this
excess to the defendant association. This association thus under-
took an unjust and immoral action against the pocketbooks of
third parties, and attempted to enrich itself at the cost of the latter.
The plaintiff was absolutely in the right when he, as an honest
merchant, rejected such a proposition.
The Reiclisgericht 3' has also held a boycott against a cus-
tomer immoral in a case where the boycotting association sought
to force the customer to recognize a judgment of arbitration, the
validity of which was not above suspicion, and to prevent him
from attacking, in an action before the ordinary courts, the con-
tract of arbitration and the procedure based on the same.
The Reichsgericht does not, however, stop after deciding that
in certain cases the boycott is an immoral means of combat. It
goes further and holds that under certain circumstances there is
an actual obligation to enter into contractual relations. The fact
that a firm which actually holds a monopoly refuses, when not
justified by economic reasons, to enter into contractual relations
on the general terms usually employed, can be a serious injury to
the party affected thereby and an immoral measure. In such cases
M. v. Reichsverb. d. Deut. Mediz.-Drogen-u. Spezialit~ten-Grosshandels,
120 Zivil. 47 (1928), J. W. (1928) 1592.
'J. W. (1924) 1155.
' Verb. Deut. Damen-u. Midchen-Nintelfabrikanten v. H., supra note 32.
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the Reichsgericht gives him a right of action on the basis of the
provision in the Civil Code already quoted. 36 The court, however,
does not declare to what extent there exists in such cases a legal
obligation to enter into a contract in order to prevent this
damage.
3 7
In the same way, business people engaged in carrying on an
enterprise necessary to public intercourse, who create a monopoly
by their combination, may not impose business terms by which
they reserve to themselves unreasonable advantages and at the
same time bind the public in an unreasonable way.
38
A recent decision 39 shows how reluctant the Reichsgericht is
to assume an abuse of a monopoly. The defendant, having a
monopoly, refused to continue business relations with the plaintiff,
who was seriously injured by the discontinuance of the contract.
The Reichs.qericht dismissed the claim. If the business relations
with the defendant were as vital to the plaintiff as he alleges, he
should have entered into a long term contract. In that case, the
question would have arisen whether the plaintiff had given the
defendant sufficient cause for the breach, and the burden of proof
would have been on the defendant. The plaintiff cannot, how-
ever, demand that, on the basis of Section 826 of the Civil Code,
a contract between the parties, actually non-existent, should be
deemed to exist.40
The granting of preferred rebates (treurabatt) is not contra
bonos mores.
B. Tying Contracts
The so-called tying contracts are contracts in which the lessee
of a machine or plant which is indispensable to his business, or
which is patented or otherwise monopolized, in order to avoid a
'SB. G. B. § 826, supra p.
NIPPERDEY, KONTRAHIERUNGSZMANG UND DIREXTER VERTAG; cf. R. G. in
ART..I.L. (I927) 193 and the decisions therein quoted; Luley, ibid. 211; Wimnpf-
heiner, ibid. (1929) i; and SPERME, ZULASSUNGSZWANG LJND MONOPOLIAISS-
BRAUCH (1929).
18 Cf. Siidd. Transp. Vers. A-G v. W., io6 Zivil. 386, 388; J. W. (1926)
12o and decisions there cited.
"1Ibid.
"R. G. in J. W. (1927) 1982.
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revocation of the license to use said machine or plant, undertakes
to purchase accessories and replacement parts and all other
machines necessary to his business exclusively from the lessor of
the machine, although he could procure them from the lessor's
competitors at better terms. They may also be contracts by which
the purchaser obligates himself to order all machines necessary to
his business from the seller of a certain part of his machinery, who
possesses a monopoly on that part, although the purchaser could
buy the other machines at better terms from other sources. Such
a contract is not, under ordinary circumstances, deemed a boycott
against the customer within the meaning of Section 9 of the Cartel
Order. It may, however, under certain conditions be so con-
sidered.
These contracts are therefore legal and binding according to
German law so long as the Reichswirtschaftsminister does not
interfere with them as being against public policy or the common
welfare, within the meaning of Section 4 or Section IO of the Car-
tel Order; and does not, directly or through the Cartel Court, have
them declared void or give the customer the right to withdraw
from the contract or give notice of his intent to terminate it.
C. Price-cutting
Price-cutting according to a preconceived plan is not always
a special means of regulating competition. It is also employed in
free competition, and is permitted as a fair method by German
law, so long as it does not injure competitors without advancing
one's own business interests. The question as to how far price-
cutting comes within Section 9 of the Cartel Order depends on
its character as a means of regulating competition, as contrasted
with its tendency merely to influence the price level.41 The Reichs-
gericht has said, with regard to price-cutting:
"It is not permissible to consider price-cutting an inju-
rious measure similar to a boycott, if the customer takes
advantage of the low prices of the association, in order to be
able to compete. The fact that the price-cutting makes its
KEsTNER-LEHNICH, ORGANISATIONSWANG 297.
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influence felt in the business of the plaintiff and causes him
to reduce his prices is not material in determining whether an
injury has been suffered by him. Otherwise a cartel would
be deprived of its most important means of combat and its
whole existence would be shaken. It was, however, not the
intention of the Cartel Order to make the existence of cartels
generally impossible. The ordinance is the result of a com-
promise between two points of view which considered a cartel
from different economic standpoints and which intended
simply to do away with the evils of the cartel system and to
prevent the abuse of its economic power. Consequently, it
cannot be admitted that price-cutting is allowed to a single
industrial concern but not to a cartel. If this were true, the
result would be that customers, in their own interests, would
purchase at the reduced price and would not buy any goods
from another producer." 42
D. Rings (Agreements Not to Tender)
The ring is a secret combination for regulating competition
against one who desires to receive offers from an open market.
While many eminent authorities consider the ring unfair be-
cause the customer is intentionally deceived, the Reichsgericht
considers it permissible in principle. The court has declared that
the ring arises out of the economic necessity of self-preservation
against price-cutting at public biddings, which is injurious to the
public welfare. It has declared such cartels to be contra bonos
mores only if their purpose is to deceive the offeree and thus
obtain, at his expense, unjustifiable advantages or exorbitantly
high prices. The Reichsgericht held that a case where the suc-
cessful bidder had offered to pay a compensation to the other
bidders fell within this class. 4 3 The adherents of the view taken
by the Reichsgercht, upholding the fundamental fairness of a
ring, defend their position by the statement that the offeree has
no right to demand that the offers come from an open market. It
is a recognized rule of law that every prospective buyer does not
have such a right.
"'Rh. Linoleum-Werke B. v. Deut. Linoleum-Werke et al, supra note 21,
at 369.
'3J. W. (1913); 134; ibid. (1914) 976; ibid. (92o) 431; ibid. (1926) 155o.
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"Otherwise no price cartel of industrial firms could
exist. There is no reason to be seen why a prospective buyer
asking for bids should have the right to the same on an open
market, which others have not. Furthermore, one cannot
make the general statement that bids made in combination
with others will deceive the buyer. In the important case of
bids asked for by public officials, such combinations are either
well known or the officials must at least count on the existence
of a ring among the bidders." 44
E. Maintenance of Resale Prices 4'
By this means "the sale price is regulated not only for the
producers but also for the wholesale and retail dealers, in such a
way that the determination of the price according to the state of
the market is made very difficult, if not prevented entirely". 4 6
Agreements of this sort are, according to German decisions, per-
missible and binding in so far as they do not endanger the turnover
of, or create exorbitant prices for, the necessities of daily life; or
they are to be looked upon as illegal or immoral, because they
oppress the customer or exploit without limit the advantages of a
monopoly against the dealer or the public.
4 7
The German courts protect agreements as to the maintenance
of resale prices of standard articles, by considering the violation
of this system of fixed resale prices as unfair competition in the
nature of dumping and therefore subject to damages. According
to the decisions, dumping of this sort consists in the regular sale
of such goods at the price set by the producer, although the seller
knows that the latter desires the resale to be made at the set price,
and for this purpose has built up a certain system of inspection.
The courts find the unfair competition in the fact that the reseller
has secured the articles in question at cheaper prices in intentional
contravention of the contractual obligation, or by taking advantage
of the breach of his seller's contract with the producer, for the
"Giehler, J. W. (1926) 2080.
"Cf. Fluhme, Preisunterbeitung bei Markenartikeln nach deutschem und
auslidndischen Recht, KARTELL. (1927) 451.
"Tscherschky, ibid. (1929) 88.
'M. v. Reichsverb. d. Deut. Mediz.-Drogen-u. Spezialititen-Grosshandeds,
supra note 33.
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purpose of damaging his competitor and the producer by selling
at a cheaper price, to his own advantage. Only in case the agree-
ment as to the minimum resale price is, in itself, contra bonos,
mores and invalid, is it considered fair to combat the same by
dumping.
In this matter, also, the Cartel Court has acted in protecting
the general public against the power of the organization, and has
taken a different point of view. In one case 18 the Cartel Court
gave its protection to a retail dealer against whom a boycott had
been declared because he had refused to sign an obligation binding
him to the maintenance of resale prices. The court said:
"The attempt of the plaintiff to force the retail iron
dealer in question, who was still free, not having as yet
signed the articles of the association, into the sale organiza-
tion of the association of steel works was an unreasonable
restraint of his economic freedom and contained the 'danger'
mentioned in the first alternative of Section 9, subsection 2
of the Cartel Order."
In the same way, the president of the Cartel Court, in a recent
decision, prevented uniform price maintenance through a collective
agreement between the cigarette factories and a part of their
wholesale and retail trade, refusing to give the required permission
for a boycott of outsiders.
While the ordinary courts base their decisions on the fact
that the inducing of a breach of contract is unfair competition, the
Cartel Court, in the interest of preserving freedom of trade and
commerce, refuses to protect monopolies organized for the purpose
of controlling competition.
49
F. Bogus Independents
Concealing the interdependence of several firms having dif-
erent names may, under certain circumstances, be unfair. In a
KARTELL (1927) 268.
"Tschierschky, supra note 46, at 88, 136, and 2oo, denies that the prevailing
view of the law finds its foundation in our ruling economic and legal principles,
and that refusing to maintain dictated prices and selling at cheaper prices within
the scope of sound commercial principles without "dumping"-that is, selling
at any price-can constitute, in our economic system based fundamentally on
freedom of price competition, an illegal act.
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case decided by the Reichsgeriht,50 the defendant had concealed
the fact that he was the owner of two firms, in order to use the
second firm as a competitor when making his bid. The bids made
by both firms were determined by him, but the offeree was led to
believe that the prices were competitive. The first appellate court
dismissed the complaint because, considering the fact that the
product was a monopoly, the defendant had suffered no damage.
The Reichsgericht reversed this decision and gave judgment for
the plaintiff, saying:
"This deceit practiced on the public constitutes an im-
moral act which contravenes the principles of an honest
merchant in his business dealings. Even if the defendant has
a monopoly of the type in question, this fact does not justify
him in employing such deceitful methods in fixing his prices."
(Editor's Note: The second part of this article, dealing with
unfair methods of regulating competition in England and in the
United States, will be published in the May issue of the RmIEW.)
J . W. (1926) 1549.
